Redress of historical injustice in access to land provided a mobilizing force for the overthrow of the apartheid government in South Africa. Inequality of access to water resources marks South Africa's history even more profoundly than inequality of access to land. Yet in South Africa, post-apartheid legislative reform relating to land and water has followed largely separate, if parallel, paths. This paper traces the development and current status of water reforms in the Inkomati Water Management Area, where water use is dominated by established commercial agriculture and forestry, by important environmental interests, including the Kruger National Park, and by demands for improved access to water from a black population of around 1.5 million living in former Bantustan areas. It indicates that in practice water and land reform are interdependent, but, although both have become more closely linked within local political and economic arenas, they remain largely disconnected and disabled by unresolved tensions within their separate policy processes. The paper argues that the commoditised nature of land and water use within the established patterns of commercial agriculture sets constraints on what redistributive land and water reform can deliver to those historically dispossessed. In particular, increasing recourse to 'strategic partnerships' between African community landowners and commercial agribusiness as a means of maintaining the productivity of commercial farmland poses questions about the control and beneficial use of new forms of communal property.
INTRODUCTION
The establishment of majority rule in South Africa in 1994 was regarded by many South Africans as only a first step in redressing the discrimination and dispossession to which the black population had been subject by previous governments. Key targets of redress were the 1913 Land Act that excluded black South Africans from purchasing land and acquiring freehold titles, and the subsequent (1936) legislation restricting black peoples' settlement to constitutionally-defined 'tribal' reserves. So fundamental was this legislation to the apartheid era that a white paper on its abolition 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Land Reforms and Management of Natural Resources in Africa and Latin America, 25-27 November, 2010 , in Lleida, Spain. The author wishes to acknowledge the very useful comments of three anonymous referees.
2 and introduction of a process of land reform was already published in 1991, three years before elections for a new government.
While discrimination in access to land was one of the most politically potent symbols of the gross discrimination that marked South African society, disparities in access to water were, if anything, more pronounced. This continues to be felt, particularly in rural areas of South Africa, where Cullis and van Koppen (2007) have estimated Gini coefficients that suggest the considerable level of income inequality (Gini 0.64) is dwarfed by the disparity in direct water use (Gini 0.95). As in the case of land, this reflects historical exclusion of the black majority population from property rights in water under the apartheid regime (Woodhouse, 1995) .
However, post-apartheid prospects of redistribution of land and water from existing 'haves' to 'have nots' raised considerably the political risks attached to the implementation of reform. Indeed, contemplating reform at the close of the apartheid era, a World Bank-funded centre for policy analysis in Johannesburg observed: 'the political will [needed] to amend the [water] law is probably greater than that required for land distribution' (LAPC, 1994 , quoted in Woodhouse, 1995 . This observation arose from recognition that irrigated agriculture is the largest user of water in South Africa, and that access to irrigation is necessary for the financial viability of much of South Africa's commercial farming sector and a key element of private property in natural resource use under the apartheid regime. In this paper I argue that the nationalization of de jure private property in water under the National Water Act (1998) has yet to be felt in any diminution of de facto control of water resources by commercial agricultural entities inherited from the apartheid era.
In part, this is because agricultural water use represents something of a blind spot for popular political debate on water, which focuses on drinking water, identified as a distinct 'water sector'. This separation is reinforced by the fact that drinking water ('water services') is governed by a separate reform process under the Water Services Act (1997) . The pre-eminence in public understanding of a 'water sector' delivering treated water for household consumption is understandable from the point of view of an urban majority population in South Africa. However this locates analysis of commodification of water in a perspective on (mostly urban) water services, and ignores the quite different dynamics that apply to (rural) agricultural water use.
Specifically, the analysis of the commodification of water identifies water as a resource whose provision has hitherto been via a heavily subsidised public service, subject currently to processes of reduction of the role of the state (deregulation) and reregulation to promote marketization of water services. Case studies, such as those assembled by McDonald and Ruiters (2005) , document struggles over this process, in which resistance is marshalled under the banner of water as a human right which cannot be negotiated according to market principles alone.
It is not to deny the importance of such arguments to observe that they apply to only 20 per cent of total water use. They ignore, therefore, the almost 60 per cent of water which is used by agriculture and which was largely controlled by commercial interests by the mid-twentieth century. If this agricultural water has been overlooked by the critical literature on water services commodification, it has also been neglected by the political narrative of land reform. Despite the necessarily intimate relationship between the outcomes of land reform and water reform, these have largely followed parallel paths governed by separate state agencies. In both cases, however, the pace of actual redistribution of resources to historically disadvantaged people has been slow.
The consequences of the separation of land and water reform processes are now more frequently recognized. Greenberg (2010: 11) notes that 'many land reform farms have failed precisely because water has not been available for production', and he cites the National Planning Commission's recent emphasis on 'the alignment of water resource allocation with land reform' (Greenberg, 2010:10) .
This article draws on a study spanning fifteen years that explored processes of reform of water management institutions in the north-east province of Mpumalanga, an area of intensive water use by commercial agriculture, and also the site of some of the largest land transfers under South Africa's land reform. The article identifies how water reform has interacted with processes of land reform in this area. It argues that a largely ineffective process of legislative reform of water governance has gained impetus from transfers of irrigated farms under land restitution claims. Despite this impact of land reform's 'facts on the ground', however, the outcomes of redistributive reform are far from clear. On the one hand, re-allocation of water to other, particularly small-scale, potential agricultural water users remains disabled by 4 unresolved tensions within the processes of policy reform. On the other hand, the 'locking in' of land and water into existing patterns of commercial agriculture poses questions about the nature and trajectory of new forms of 'community' property being created by land reform. The paper begins with a brief review of the national progress of land and water reform in South Africa. It then provides an empirical account of the implementation of reform of water governance in the Inkomati river basin and identifies how the dynamics of water reform and land reform have interacted. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for wider debates on agricultural development and property rights in land and water.
South Africa's Land reform
The overall goal defined for South Africa's land reform was to transfer 30 per cent of white-owned agricultural land (24.9 million ha) to black farmers (Lahiff, 2008) . This remained a distant prospect when land reform had only achieved the transfer of 4.3 per cent (of which a considerable element of state-owned land) in the first decade (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) of majority rule (Bernstein et al., 2005) . However, continuing high levels of inequality, unemployment and poverty in South Africa have maintained political pressure to quicken the pace of land reform. A Land Summit in 2005 committed the government to renew its efforts to assist black farmers to purchase land through grants and loans, in order to achieve its redistribution goal of 30 per cent of commercial farmland by 2014. Despite a number of new initiatives this deadline has subsequently been postponed to 2025 (Greenberg, 2010) . South Africa's land reform embraces three distinct processes: restitution, redistribution and tenure reform. Restitution involved restoring to specific individuals or groups land from which they claimed they had been evicted as a result of racially discriminatory laws since 1913. Redistribution involved government-assisted purchase of white-owned farmland by black farmers on a 'willing buyer, willing seller' basis. Tenure reform aimed to improve security of tenure of people occupying land in areas reserved for black people ('Bantustans', later 'homelands', under apartheid), governed under customary or 'tribal' authority. In addition, legal measures were introduced, in the form of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (LTA) in 5 1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) of 1997 to protect farm workers from eviction from houses and land they occupied on the commercial farms where they worked.
Land restitution was originally due to be completed by the end of 2007. About 70 per cent of claims had been settled by late 2005 (Bernstein et al., 2005) , and the great majority of claims to land that now lies within urban areas had been resolved (usually by payment of cash compensation) by 2008 (Lahiff, 2008: 16) . In rural areas, land claims more often involved transfer of ownership of land, existing (white) landowners being compensated by government at an agreed valuation of the land. The most delayed of restitution cases involved large areas of highly productive commercial farmland, among which land claims in Mpumalanga Province featured prominently.
Nationally, it has been estimated that, by 2009, the settlement of 75,787 restitution claims had resulted in the transfer of 2.62 million ha of land to black owners (Greenberg, 2010) . Set against a total of 79,696 claims registered (Lahiff, 2008: 14) , this suggests under 5 per cent (3909) of restitution claims remained unresolved by 2009. However, about a third of remaining unresolved claims are 'complex' -often subject to contestation by the existing owners, or by competing restitution claims to the same land, boundary disputes between customary authorities, or insufficient evidence of eviction -and result in lengthy hearings in the Land Claims Court (Lahiff, 2008: 17) . Progress is consequently slow, but also costly. In 2011, the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform was spending R2.5bn on restitution claims, but with a target to resolve only 60 claims in a year. (Cousins, 2011; Hall, 2009; Lahiff and Cousins, 2005) . A further view sees land redistribution as providing security for rural communities in which '(M)ost households survive on welfare grants supplemented with subsistence agriculture and natural resources harvested from the commons' (Cousins and Hornby, 2007) .
In practice, a succession of government schemes providing grants and loans for the purchase of farmland by black farmers has seen increasing emphasis on support for a class of entrepreneurial black commercial farmers. Thus, the Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), initiated in the 1990s, explicitly targeted poorer people who generally had to pool their grants in order to purchase a (large-scale) commercial farm, which they subsequently subdivided or attempted to run collectively. In 2001 the SLAG was replaced by the Land Reform for Agricultural Development (LRAD) scheme which provided larger grants and hence enabled existing commercial farms to be acquired by individuals. Following the Land Summit in 2005, the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) allowed government to purchase land as it came up for sale, for later redistribution to black farmers. While this was intended to increase the pace of land transfers, according to Lahiff (2008) it effectively directed existing land purchase budgets to a smaller area of more productive land, to be redistributed in larger units to an elite of agricultural entrepreneurs.
Despite (or because of) this growing emphasis on the 'commercial viability' of redistributed farmland, there is growing concern at the perceived failure of the beneficiaries of land reform to gain adequate access to markets (for inputs and produce) and financial and technical services (Greenberg, 2010) . This has prompted scrutiny of the capacity of government departments to deliver such services, and the DLA and its successor DRDLR are widely seen as lacking the human resources to plan and implement commercially 'viable' agricultural projects on redistributed land.
Others have argued that notions of farm 'viability' are themselves open to competing interpretations and require more rigorous scrutiny within policy processes (Cousins and Scoones, 2010; Hall, 2009 ).
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The third element of land reform was intended to provide improved security of land tenure to the 17 million people living within the areas designated as 'homelands' under apartheid, where access to land was governed by customary, or 'tribal' authority. In practice, widespread public discontent with tribal authorities (Levin and Weiner, 1997; Ntsebeza, 1999) Under the terms of the separate CLRA: 'If a community has a recognised traditional council, the powers and duties of the land administration committee of such community may be exercised and performed by such council'. Although the administration of land by tribal authorities had not been explicitly legislated in either bill, the combined effect of both was to produce that result (Smith, 2008: 61) .
Implementation of the CLRA never took place, however, as a consequence of a constitutional challenge mounted by civil society and community organizations, and was eventually ruled unconstitutional by South Africa's Constitutional Court on 11
May 2010, the DRDLR having earlier indicated that it would not oppose the Court's ruling and would repeal and replace the Act (LRG, 2010) . The question of land rights in former Bantustan areas remains unresolved, therefore, and this continues to have repercussions not only for the development of water resources for black farmers in such areas, but also for the content of new forms of community property created by land reform, as will be discussed in more detail later in this paper. Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in Dublin (Calder, 1999; Heathcote, 1998; World Bank, 1993 . The key ICWE principles are:
1. The River Basin is a natural unit of analysis and management. A holistic approach to water management is advocated, i.e. Integrated Catchment
Management.
2. Action should be taken at the lowest appropriate level (subsidiarity). This will necessitate the devolution/decentralization of management.
3. Water has an economic value. Economic instruments should be used to encourage the efficient use of the resource. The goal of redressing past inequality means that South Africa's water reform is expected to deliver not only changes in process (holistic, decentralized, participatory and economically costed), but also a change in social outcomes (redistribution of water allocation). In practice, although nineteen Water Management Areas (WMAs) were designated soon after the NWA passed into law in 1998, the decentralized organizations envisaged to manage water -a Catchment Management Agency 
The Inkomati Water Management Area
The Inkomati WMA is located in Mpumalanga Province, north-eastern South Africa, bordering Mozambique to the East and Swaziland to the South-East. It is made up of three principle river catchments: the Sabie-Sand, the Crocodile and the Komati (top to bottom on Map 1). All drain in an easterly direction and eventually flow into Mozambique. The water in the catchment is mostly generated by rainfall (up to 1500mm per year) in the summer months on the Highveld plateau in the west (2,000m above sea level), and on the Great Escarpment, which divides the Highveld from the Lowveld (140m above sea level) to the east where rainfall is lower (400 to 1,000 mm) and temperatures higher. Annual evaporation rates vary across the WMA, from less than 1,400mm on the Highveld to more than 1,900mm in the Lowveld, and as a result irrigation requirements vary (DWAF, 2004) , with higher demand in the drier and hotter Lowveld.
During the apartheid government, the black population was evicted from the highveld and escarpment and much of the lowveld, and resettled in a series of ethnicallydesignated 'homeland' areas in the lowveld, governed from the 1970s by tribal 'national' administrations funded by the South African state. The two homeland areas known as KaNgwane had a population of about 1.5 million by the turn of the century.
The areas from whence people had been evicted were used for white-owned business: commercial forest plantations on the Highveld and escarpment, and irrigated agriculture, principally sugar cane and tropical fruit (citrus, banana, avocado, mango and macadamia), on the Lowveld. A substantial part of the eastern Lowveld is occupied by the Kruger National Park. Much of the highly-productive irrigated land was subject to restitution claims under the terms of South Africa's land reform. These included a claim to some 32000 ha of 'highly commercial' farmland in the lowveld, settled in June 2007 at a cost of R601 million (US$ 12 million) to the government land restitution budget (Lahiff, 2008: 15 
Implementing Water Reform
Under the terms of the National Water Act, all water in South Africa is considered to Water Act, the CMAs will have three initial functions:
 To investigate and advise on the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of water resources in its WMA.
 To develop a catchment management strategy.
 To coordinate the related activities of water management institutions within the WMA.
The NWA provides that central government (DWAF) may delegate far-reaching powers to the CMA, phased over time as and when the CMA is deemed a 'responsible authority'. A key function, not initially delegated, is the issue of licences to replace 'existing lawful use' of water authorized under previous (apartheid) legislation. This will require all water users to apply for a licence to continue using water. Under licencing arrangements water may be re-allocated from existing use so as to achieve a fairer allocation of water, to improve the efficiency of resource management or to protect water quality (section 43). In order to undertake such a function, the CMA would effectively take over many of the operational functions currently undertaken by the DWAF regional office in Nelspruit. The staffing and operation of the CMA is to be funded by a water management charge levied on all water users, in addition to volumetric tariffs already charged for water use.
Within the WMA, water management at a local level is to be undertaken by Water
Users' Associations (WUAs), defined as 'co-operative associations of individual water users who wish to undertake water-related activities for their mutual benefit'.
Each WUA is to be managed by a management committee, and may charge its members to fund its activities.
The implementation of the CMA in the Inkomati WMA has been characterized by a struggle between the main local water users, particularly white-owned commercial farming interests, and officials of the DWAF national headquarters in Pretoria. This process, set out in more detail elsewhere (Brown and Woodhouse, 2006; Woodhouse and Hassan, 1999) 
Emerging Dynamics of Change
Within the overall context of organizational reform outlined above, it is possible to identify four areas of contested change which have significantly influenced the outcomes of the water and land reforms in the Inkomati water management area.
These are: firstly, the legacy of information asymmetry on water use in irrigation;
second, the persistence of an institutional dualism separating water rights in commercial farming from that in former Bantustan areas; third, the impacts of land restitution claims on racial distribution of land and water use; and finally the reform of commercial farmers' irrigation boards to become more inclusive water users' associations.
Information Asymmetries and Water Allocation Reform
The process of water allocation reform in the NWA is premised on prior verification of 'existing lawful use' to establish a baseline upon which to base re-allocation (and licensing) decisions. To the extent that existing lawful use cannot be verified, therefore, water re-allocation is effectively stalled. This has emerged as a central issue In an effort to break through the paralyzing effects of lack of information on water use, the DWAF head office in Pretoria invoked the provisions of the NWA to undertake compulsory licensing of all water use in the Inkomati WMA. This required all existing water users to register the quantity and source of their water use during a specified 'qualifying period ' (1996-98) , and to register a formal application for future water use. Registered water use was then verified by means of satellite images for both the qualifying period and the current, or verification, period (2004) . Following verification, DWAF was to formulate a proposal of overall water use for specific subcatchments, taking account of priorities to provide water for basic human needs and for ecosystem maintenance (together referred to as 'the reserve') and any international obligations. This proposal was then to be translated into allocations for individual farms, published as a 'preliminary allocation schedule', and subsequently finalized (subject to appeals heard by a water tribunal) in the form of licences issued to water users.
It is important to observe that the verification process does not measure water use directly, but estimates it from the area irrigated within each farm boundary, as shown on the satellite images. In the Inkomati WMA, the initial verification stage indicated that in 2004 the total area of land being irrigated had increased by about 17000ha
relative to that observed in 1996-98. Resolving whether this was due to more efficient irrigation, allowing more land to be irrigated with the same amount of water, or to an unlawful increase in the amount of water being used, requires officials to visit the farms concerned to investigate in more detail. In practice the procedure proved hugely time-consuming. The delays in establishing the CMA, the relatively sophisticated technical requirements of the exercise and the ever-present threat of litigation from influential local commercial farming interests, made it almost inevitable that water allocation reform would be implemented by DWAF acting as a central government agency -albeit using a team of specialists ('consultants') hired for the purpose. 
A Continuing Dualism in Water Governance
The stalled verification and licensing process continues to be seen as the basis of a reallocation through a reduction in the amount of water which commercial agricultural operators are licensed to use. However, its actual impact is likely to be heavily modified, if not completely overshadowed, by two other dynamics at work.
The first relates to the legacy of water governance in the KaNgwane 'homeland' under apartheid. Water rights in KaNgwane were held by the tribal administration, but, unlike land rights controlled directly by traditional authorities (chiefs), water notionally allocated by DWAF in the 1970s for KaNgwane development was administered by the Kangwane Department of Agriculture. When the homeland administration was dissolved after 1994, the Mpumalanga Provincial Department of Agriculture (DoA) inherited the water allocations and other responsibilities (and in some cases the staff) of the KaNgwane Department of Agriculture. Thus, it remains the case that for black farmers in the former homeland areas, there are no individual, or even group, water rights, but all water allocations for 'development projects' are aggregated and held by the DoA that is responsible for paying the respective water fees to DWA in Nelspruit.
In some respects this separate dispensation for residents in former homelands might be regarded as a rational way of administering water used by large numbers of smallscale users. There is no legal requirement for registration of 'schedule 1' use of untreated water resources (i.e. not provided via formal water service) for household use. Moreover a view expressed by DWA officials in Pretoria in 2010 is that individuals using water for household purposes, for watering livestock, and for smallscale irrigation in former homeland areas should be subject only to a 'general authorization' applicable to a defined area within which a water licence is not required. Such arguments are consistent with the use of the DoA as a collective proxy for water rights in former homeland areas.
However, two consequences are apparent in this continuing dualism of institutional access to water. Firstly, there is a risk that the DoA will act in lieu of a Water Users Association for black farmers in former Bantustan areas, undermining the wider participation and representation of this group of water users in the (eventually) reformed institutions of governance of water use. Secondly, and linked with this institutional separation, there is the historical legacy that the KaNgwane administration failed to develop infrastructure necessary to use the water notionally allocated to it -water that became 'allocated' by default to white commercial farmers. This suggests a risk that any present and future demands to increase investment in water infrastructure (e.g. canals or storage dams) in former homeland areas with implications for formal water allocation (licencing) for farmers in these areas will (re)produce the same response from water management institutions as they have since the apartheid era: that the Inkomati is a 'water-stressed' catchment and that all water has already been allocated.
Land Restitution Impacts on Irrigated Agriculture
A second dynamic, which some see as circumventing the paralysed water allocation reform process, is generated by large-scale transfer of commercial farmland to black communities as a result of land restitution claims: the restoration of ownership of land from which they were evicted under the apartheid regime. In the main sugar-cane growing areas of the lower Crocodile River, at least 40,000ha of commercial sugarcane and fruit orchards were subject to such claims. A number of existing white farmowners agreed to accept government compensation payments and in 2007 around 18,000ha was transferred to the communities who had registered claims to them.
Other landowners, organized as 'Onderberg pro-active' resisted restitution claims, and, aided by the failure of claimants to resolve competing claims to the same land by different communities, succeeded in having restitution claims withdrawn from about 23,000ha of commercial farmland (Land Claims Court, Randberg, 21/02/2011).
Leadership for claim settlements has come from the company that owns two sugar mills in the area, as well as 5000ha of the farmland subject to restitution claims. The company has been active in promoting the development of small-scale sugar production in the former homeland areas of Nkomazi and has set up a series of joint venture arrangements whereby commercial farms on restituted land have been maintained in large-scale commercial production. The joint venture typically involves a commercial agricultural company and the community who now own the land. In effect, the land is leased from the land-owning community by a production company jointly owned by a community trust and the commercial partner. The community (who typically number 2000-3000 people on a 2000-3000ha restitution claim) receive the lease income and also a share of the profits of the production company.
This model, implemented with five community trusts in the Nkomazi area, offers the prospect of maintaining production on highly capitalized farms and (of particular importance for industrial sugar producers) maintenance of cane supply to the sugar mills. This type of model, now strongly advocated for both restitution claims and land redistribution projects in South Africa, is driven by two factors.
Firstly, land is generally not transferred in its 'natural' form, but as a commoditized asset of a highly capitalized business. However, the transfer of land does not bring with it the ownership of the moveable assets needed to farm it, such as irrigation equipment, farm machinery, or vehicles, necessitating further finance. This links to the second factor driving this particular form of land settlement: the relatively high failure rate of farms transferred from white to black ownership under the government's grant-assisted 'willing buyer, willing seller' (SLAG and LRAD) land redistribution schemes. Farm failures have been attributed to inadequate appraisal of farm potential (marginal farms have been offered for sale) and unrealistic business plans designed to maximize advisors' commissions paid by government (Joubert and Kruger, 2005) . In contrast, sugar mill operators have a strong incentive to maintain land reform farms in production, not only to secure cane supply, but also because a significant transfer of its cane supply into black ownership contributes towards establishing itself as a site of 'black economic empowerment', rather than a refuge of white landed privilege. Further, it may be viewed as a means of safeguarding existing water allocations for sugar production. More than one official interviewed in the area commented that, with the transfer of land-ownership, perhaps there is now no need to pursue water reallocation from existing commercial farming use.
Experience elsewhere in South Africa (Davis and Lahiff, 2011; Derman et al., 2010; Tapela, 2005) arrangements to operate the land as a joint venture using a farm management company foundered as a result of problems with loan agreements and, after two years, collapse of commercial revenue on the transferred land meant the IB was unable to retrieve water fees from the land-owning communities. This in turn meant the IB was unable to cover its payments to DWAF, which are invoiced according to water allocated, not water used. As a consequence, the remaining commercial producers within the IB were seeking to lease back about half the transferred land from its new owners in order to restore output to commercial levels and generate enough income to cover the IB's water allocation.
Irrigation Boards and More Inclusive Local Water Governance
The 
Separate Development in South Africa's Land and Water Reforms
The roots of separation between land and water reform are not only to be found within South Africa. The perception of water primarily in terms of a 'service'
(treated/potable water) delivered by a distinct 'sector', noted at the start of this paper, is also a feature of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (UN-MDG, 2009 ). Even when considered in broader, 'natural resource management' terms, international 'best practice' embodied in the ICWE principles emphasizes integrated management of water resources. Some have commented this may undermine integration with priorities beyond the water sector, translating development problems and goals as subordinate to the boundaries and hydrological dynamics of 'catchment management', rather than the other way round (Mollinga et al., 2007; Lenton and Muller, 2009: 208) . It seems that the main vehicle for water reform, the CMA, may have fallen victim to this syndrome. The wide representation of water users' interests which the governing board was intended to provide has -in the Inkomati WMA at least -thus far proved an inadequate means of integrating specialist water management skills with local political and development agendas. As a consequence, the CMA has been increasingly questioned as a costly duplication of the functions of regional DWAF offices.
As noted earlier, the need to integrate land and water reform has been acknowledged at the highest policy levels, such as the National Planning Commission. In its 2009- Similarly, despite increasing recognition of the importance of supplementing water supplies for small-scale agriculture, either for 'backyard irrigation' using piped water services (Main and Naidoo, 2008 cited in van Koppen et al., 2009: 23) or through rainwater harvesting and storage (Botha and de Lange, 2005) , co-ordinated policy between DWAF and other government agencies appears ephemeral, at best.
The lack of integration between land and water reform is evinced in a fundamental difference in approach to commodification of resources. Land reform has been framed by the concept of land as private property, exchanged via payments at market rates, albeit payments funded by the state, and 'sales' compulsorily imposed by land claims courts in the case of restitution claims. In contrast, water reform has involved the abolition of many pre-existing forms (e.g. riparian rights) of private property in water.
Under the NWA, licencing of private water use is subordinated to broader social (basic water needs), environmental, and international treaty priorities (collectively termed 'the reserve') as identified by the National Water Strategy. The 'reserve' is to be defined for all major catchments in South Africa. However, unlike the 30 per cent farmland reallocation target of land reform, there is no quantitative target for water resource re-allocation to historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs), beyond the supply of piped drinking water.
In practice, the Inkomati case suggests that, in the absence of a 'headline' political target for re-allocation of water, DWAF's water reform has sought legitimacy in technocratic arguments based on sustainability and efficiency of water use. This has involved delays due to technical complexity, for example in calculating the size of 'the reserve'. The experience of verification of agricultural use in the Inkomati WMA also suggests that the approach has demanded more technical resources than the shrinking technical capacity of the DWAF can supply, and consequent paralysis of water allocation reform. In the event, such transfers of water as have occurred have been locked into commodified form as inputs to existing patterns of commercial farming.
It is important to note here Walker's (2005) argument that most black South Africans' primary concerns are over jobs, housing and the provision of basic services, and that it is only in the context of failure to satisfy these concerns for large numbers of black people that restoring access to land assumes political potency as a discourse of redress With respect to land, the new community trusts embody a collective form of property that is locked into the leasehold arrangements of joint venture farming. The trusts are necessarily linked to structures of traditional leadership and customary authority through which restitution claims were organized and legitimated. Assuming the joint venture enterprises are successful in commercial terms, and in the case of sugar farms in the Nkomazi area there appear to be strong corporate incentives to this end, they constitute new forms of community income to be managed, and raise questions how this will be articulated with structures of customary authority. The controversies over the Communal Land Rights Act illuminated contested interpretations over the nature of customary authority, and, in particular, arguments that models of downward accountability (from 'chiefs' to their communities) had been largely supplanted by the incorporation of customary leaders within authoritarian structures of 'tribal administration' under apartheid (Claassens and Hathorn, 2008) . Questions therefore 24 arise as to whether post-apartheid customary authority in South Africa is capable of relinquishing the autocratic mould in which it had been cast by the apartheid state.
Tensions arising over such issues as chiefly control over land allocation have been evident in Nkomazi (King, 2005; Rangan and Glimartin, 2002) and this suggests potential contestation over the role of traditional authority in the administration of new resources from joint ventures, such as leasehold income and profit shares. The issue raised here is not simply one of individual versus collective property rights in the manner of de Soto (2000), but rather how notions of community property previously incorporated into state governance structures will be subject to new contestation and re-negotiation as a consequence of their insertion in corporate agriculture. A final observation is that, to the extent that it continues to see a future in South African agriculture framed by the politics of 'black economic empowerment', corporate capital will also need to find ways to engage with these processes of governance of community property.
